Nuclear Weapons Evolution and Strategic Deterrence Stability Between India and Pakistan

Abstract

The nuclearization of South Asia has prompted a transformation in the strategic environment between two nuclear powers India and Pakistan, from mere rivalry to multi-dimensional nuclear deterrence. The strategic scenario of India and Pakistan has taken a turn since the nuclearization of South Asia, from rivalry to an intricate nuclear deterrence relationship. Nuclear weapons have become central to the national security and strategic signaling dialogues, in addition to being introduced as a means for projecting regional power, since the 1998 tests. The India's "credible minimum deterrence" and "No First Use" policy is perceived to have a different approach to crisis behaviour and escalation process as against Pakistan's flexibility of full-spectrum deterrence and strategic ambiguity. The purpose of this paper is to grasp the historical development of nuclear programmes, strategic thinking and the modernization of technology in detail such as missile defence, hypersonic, tactical nuclear arms and the nuclear triad. Human experience of Kargil conflict in 1999, a standoff in 2001-2002, the Mumbai attacks in 2008, and the Balakot crisis of 2019 and the post-2025 tensions serve as case studies of the region's fragile stability. Results suggest that nuclear deterrence has prevented the outbreak of war; however, it does create a stability – instability paradox highlighting the importance of continued communication, confidence building, arms control, and crisis management toward achieving long-term strategic stability in South Asia.